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Abstract. This work explores what factors determine foreign direct investment (FDI) in sub-
Sahara Africa (SSA) relative to non-sub-Saharan African countries, using a panel data set which 
encompasses  most  of  the  world´s  developing  countries  between  1997  and  2006.  The  results 
indicate that institutions and infrastructure development promoted FDI to non-SSA but did not 
induce FDI to sub-Saharan Africa. Geography played a modest and indirect role. The marginal 
benefit from openness to trade was higher for SSA, which is closely related to resource-seeking 
FDI  that  did  not  translate  into  sustained  economic  growth,  neither  institutional  change,  but 
consequently crowded out the second FDI wave of manufacturing. At the same time, FDI into 
value-added manufacturing largely located in non-SSA countries acted as engine for scaling the 
economic  development  ladder  through  institutional  improvement  for  a  number  of  non-SSA 
countries. Hence, FDI has the potential to act as a reliable and equitable driver of sustained 
economic development and poverty alleviation. The destiny of the “resource curse” linked to 
FDI failure marks the novelty of this paper in the FDI and development literature. 
Key  words.  Foreign  direct  investment,  developing  countries,  sub-Saharan  Africa,  resource 
curse, geography, institutions 
 
Resumen.  Este  trabajo  investiga  los  factores  determinantes  de  la  Investigación  Extranjera 
Directa (IED) en los países de África Subsahariana, en comparación con el resto de los países en 
desarrollo, usando para ello datos de panel de entre los años 1997 y 2006. Los resultados indican 
que las instituciones  y las infraestructuras de desarrollo promueven la  IED en los países no 
subsaharianos, pero no en los países de la región subsahariana. Los factores geográficos parecen 
desempeñar un modesto e indirecto papel. Se observa también que el beneficio marginal de la 
apertura  comercial  es  más  elevado  en  los  países  subsaharianos,  lo  cual  presenta  una  íntima 
relación con el hecho de que su IED esté focalizada en la extracción de recursos naturales. Este 
tipo  de  inversión  no  se  traduce  en  crecimiento  económico  sostenible  ni  en  cambios 
institucionales destacados, y desplaza, además a una segunda ola de IED manufacturera. Por otro 
lado,  la  IED  en  sectores  manufactureros  con  valor  añadido,  y  localizada  en  países  no 
subsaharianos, actúa como motor de desarrollo a través de la mejora institucional en varios de 
estos  países.  Por  tanto,  la  IED  tiene  un  papel  potencial  como  catalizador  del  desarrollo 
económico sostenible y alivio de la pobreza. El destino de la denominada “maldición de los 
recursos”  y  su  vínculo  con  la  IED  marcan  la  novedad  de  este  artículo  en  la  literatura  del 
desarrollo y la IED. 
Palabras  clave.  Inversión  extranjera  directa,  países  en  desarrollo,  África  Subsahariana, 
maldición de los recursos naturales, geografía, instituciones 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Despite  the  efforts  of  African  governments  to  attract  foreign  direct  investment  by 
improving their policy frameworks, and despite signs of renewed economic activity in 
Africa, Africa has been largely bypassed by the recent foreign direct investment boom. 
(UNCTAD, 1999, p. 1) 
 
Foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  has  been  growing  globally,  however,  not  in  Africa.  Africa 
suffers under persistent poverty and high inequality which is symptomatic for the region´s low 
growth performance and productivity levels. African countries face considerable difficulties to 
attract FDI. Subsequently, FDI inflows to Africa are the lowest in the world. Global FDI inflows 
grew in 2006 by 34 percent. The past decade witnessed a sharp increase in FDI to developing 
countries, reaching 23.7 percent in 2006, as shown in Table 1. However, African countries did 
not  benefit  from  the  FDI  boom  as  much  as  other  developing  countries  did.  Africa  failed  to 
capitalize on the rising trend of world FDI. Why is that? 
 
In Table 1, when subtracting the economic more prosperous regions of North Africa, as well as 
the driver economy South Africa, the percentage declines significantly over time. In 2006, FDI 
flows as a percentage of GDP into sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries amounted to 1.0 percent 
relative to global FDI. Hence, countries in SSA have on average received less FDI than countries 
in other regions by virtue of their geographical location. This begs the question, what determines 
FDI flows to SSA relatively to other developing countries?  
Many  reasons  have  been  offered  to  explain  Africa´s  low  growth  performance:  in  particular 
geographic, institutional, historical, tribal and cultural. While each of them is persuasive, this 
work isolates geography and institutions to account for Africa´s FDI failure. 
 
Table 1. Developing countries and African percentage of global FDI 1970-2006 
 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2006
Developing countries* 28.7 13.9 16.1 15.3 25.6 23.7
Africa** 32.8 5.2 7.8 3.8 9.4 6.3
Other Africa*** 3.7 0.5 0.9 0.4 1.0 1.0  
*excluding China; ** Africa as share of FDI inflows of developing countries, excluding China; ***excluding North 
Africa and South Africa 
Source: Derived from UNCTAD (2008), Development and Globalization: Facts and Figures. 
 
There have been a relatively small number of recent studies that have focused on FDI in Africa. 
Research revealed a limited number of predecessors on this highly relevant field in development 
economics and economic geography. These include Asiedu (2002), Cotton and Ramachandran 
(2001), Pigato (2000)  and Morissett (2000). Hence, it may be relevant to produce  a current 
approach in 2009, since structural policy reforms have been provoked through conditional HIPC 
(Highly  Indebted  Poor  Countries  Initiative)  debt  relief,  which  intensified  the  promotion  of 
macroeconomic stability and the rule of law. Furthermore, a number of SSA countries have 
emerged from conflict into stable orders and implemented macroeconomic forces and liberalized 
their  markets  that  show  profound  effects  and  high  trade  volumes  -  regardless  of  the  global 
economic downturn. Consequently, the IMF projects an economic growth of 6.3 percent for sub-
Saharan Africa in 2009 (IMF, 2008). 
 
This work can be considered as an extension while, at the same time, amplifying a new approach 
to Asiedu (2002) that finds that FDI to developing countries and Africa are not the same and DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    5 
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underlie  different  determinants  of  FDI  promotion.  Furthermore,  Asiedu´s  regressions  do  not 
control for geographic variables and most institutional variables remain insignificant. Recent 
Panel  data  estimations  on  FDI  flows  to  Africa  was  brought  forward  by  Naudé  and  Krugell 
(2007).  They  investigated  geographic  and  institutional  determinants  of  FDI  to  Africa,  but 
omitted the inclusion of non-SSA developing countries while their estimations focused on an 
earlier period 1970-1990. They therefore left the main question unanswered: why have other 
developing countries attracted far more FDI relative to SSA? In short, the main novelty of the 
paper lies in a more detailed and current study of the relationship between SSA and the group of 
other developing countries´ institutional and geography variables and FDI flows - as additional 
explanatory variables compared to Asiedu´s study. 
 
The aim of this paper is three-fold. The first is to empirically investigate how and to what extent 
the impact of physical geography and geology on FDI mattered for SSA relative to non-SSA 
developing countries. The second is to observe whether the difference in the intensity of FDI to 
non-SSA relative to SSA countries may be due to their variation in the quality of institutions. If 
it is fixed geography that impedes economic growth, it could be manipulated by the formation of 
a region of economic integration and liberal trade policies. The third and final goal is to find 
evidence for the perception that Africa is unable to attract significant flows of FDI, except in the 
natural resource sectors of agriculture, petroleum and mining. Did institutional quality improve 
due to high resource-seeking FDI inflows into SSA countries in the past decade? If this is not the 
case it would downplay the benefits of institutional improvement in SSA for FDI promotion. At 
this point the work is interested in the feedback effect of FDI on SSA and non-SSA developing 
countries´ institutional quality when natural resources oil and mining are the main drivers behind 
it. Did institutional quality improve due to high FDI inflows into both country sets? This will be 
re-evaluated in the context of primary natural resource rich developing countries that are trapped 
in the paradox of plenty, commonly known as the “resource curse”. May it be that resource-
seeking  FDI  actually  impedes  future  sustained  economic  growth  through  industrial 
diversification?  Analysis  of  such  causality  is  quite  novel  and  can  be  regarded  as  the  core 
contribution  of  the  paper.  If  natural  resource-seeking  FDI  affects  the  quality  of  political 
institutions negatively this outcome may demand a revolution in FDI and economic development 
strategies. 
 
This  work  uses  panel  data  to  identify  the  determinants  of  FDI  in  SSA  and  the  remaining 
developing countries. An advantage of using a dataset that includes a large set of African and 
developing  countries  is  that  it  increases  the  degrees  of  freedom  and  therefore  enhances  the 
credibility of the paper´s results and conclusions. In a first Panel regression, I will estimate for 
the ten-year period 1997-2006 in order to replicate Asiedu´s (2002) approach, while including 
the paper specific new geographic and institutional variables for SSA and non-SSA countries. 
The panel data set will explore the cross-sectional and time series dimension, while increasing 
the observations, augmenting the validity of the results. 
 
The remainder of the work is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes the relevance of the 
topic, while Section 3 reviews the empirical findings and discusses them in light of the literature 
of  economic  geography  and  institutions.  Section  4  conducts  the  econometric  analysis  and 





 DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    6 
 
Felix P. Meier zu Selhausen 
 
2.  Why is FDI important for economic development? 
 
Primarily, the following section deals with the question: What is FDI and why may it be of 
relevance for developing countries, hence being the raison d’être for this work?  
 
The ancestors of large scale international merchant “trade” were the Portuguese and Spanish 
treasure fleets, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the East India Company of the British 
Empire during the early 16
th to 18
th century. Oversea colonies and merchant trade were closely 
connected to immense profits from gold, silver, silk, spices and slaves. However, modern trade 
includes foreign direct investment, which today not only exploits peacefully natural resource 
wealth  but  in  fact  more  importantly  manpower  and  low  labour  costs  for  production.  The 
Industrial Revolution and its subsequent revolution in manufacturing production techniques gave 
rise  for  new  industrial  production  sites  in  other  countries.  Simultaneously,  since  1750  real 
transport costs of ocean shipping declined dramatically and represented only a sixth in 1990 
relative to the mid 18
th century (Crafts and Venables, 2002). After the Second World War, first 
“multinationals” anticipated these developments and in the course of the “Globalisation” the 
period  saw  the  growing  role  of  FDI.  Firms  started  to  invest  into  other  countries  to  gain 
technological  spillovers,  market  shares  and  cheap  labour  to  “survive”  in  a  more  and  more 
competitive market. 
 
FDI is defined by the IMF (1993) and OECD (1996) as an investment to acquire a “lasting 
interest” in a foreign firm (country) where the foreign investor owns at least 10 percent of the 
ordinary shares. FDI flows are being classified as equity capital, reinvested earnings and other 
direct investment capital. 
 
FDI has become a vital instrument of economic development and poverty reduction, since in 
contrast  to  multilateral  foreign  aid,  FDI  is  more  difficult  to  be  misallocated  by  corrupt 
government  officials,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  serves  as  a  source  of  capital,  provides 
employment, stimulates domestic investment and enhances the diffusion of technology to the 
host country´s economy. Firms pursuing international business opportunities analyse a number 
of factors regarding the FDI location decision wherein geographic and institutional variables 
play a significant role. 
 
FDI has proven to be a trigger for regional development. Since the last 15 years of the 20
th 
century, South East Asia has benefited from large increases in FDI, either in the horizontal or 
vertical dimension. Besides the direct economic effect through higher employment, FDI can also 
trigger  a  “snowball  effect”  due  to  positive  externalities.  This  is  because  agglomeration 
economies can in theory be so strong that as soon as a critical mass in a region or country is 
reached,  capital  inflows  are  likely  to  occur  just  because  other  firms  now  see  the  need  to 
participate in this market as well. Attracting FDI is, however, not straightforward and depends on 
many  inter-related  factors;  two  important  ones  are  tested  quantitatively:  geography  and 
institutions. 
 
Once a country manages to attract FDI, the question remains whether the influence on the host 
economy is of positive nature, meaning that for instance the overall welfare effect is positive. In 
most of the literature it is suggested that FDI can influence the host economy’s productivity, 
factor markets, employment volatility, and firm efficiency through externalities, and the intended 
transfer  of  firm  assets  to  the  host  economy  (Navaretti  and  Venables,  2004).  Technological 
spillovers are, however, thought of as being subject to distance decay so that positive effects are 
regionally limited (Jaffe et al., 1993 and Keller, 2002). DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    7 
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In  the  case  of  developing  countries,  the  biggest  hurdle  appears  to  be  the  triggering  of  FDI 
inflows in the first place. Once substantial amounts have been taken place, further inflows are 
more likely to occur. Therefore, developing countries are only capable of benefiting from foreign 
activity if they satisfy a minimum threshold stock with respect to human capital and technology 
(Navaretti and Venables, 2004). According to some, it also depends on the institutional quality of 
the providing country if spillovers are necessarily fruitful (Ford et al., 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, countries need to persuade potential investors with their factor endowments, factor 
prices, demand-related factors, and also their trade regime (De Mello, 1997). Often, developing 
countries can only merchandise themselves by means of few of these factors. A country which 
has a large stock of cheap labour, a large market-size, proximity to other large markets, and a 
MNE-friendly  trade  regime  is  very  likely  to  attract  FDI.  Collins  (2004)  has  supported  the 
positive growth effect linked to FDI inflows for African countries and for developing countries 
in general. 
 
A related recent debate on this matter has been encouraged recently by Paul Collier (2008) and 
Dambisa Moyo (2009) that point to the importance of alternative instruments, apart from aid. At 
this juncture, they highlight a market-driven entrepreneurial culture being part of the African 
development puzzle, while relying less on aid transactions. Moyo (2009) calls for a revolution in 
the allocation of systematic (bilateral and multilateral) aid-payments to Africa which have not 
lived up to expectations the past 40 years but in fact perpetuated the cycle of poverty for African 
countries. She  claims that aid increased unproductive public consumption, failed to promote 
investment,  and  facilitated  corruption  while  instilling  a  culture  of  dependency.  Her  view 
conflicts  with  Jeffrey  Sachs´s  (2005)  demanded  antique  “Big  Push”  model  –  a  substantial 
increase in investment (aid) directed at key areas to end world poverty. Furthermore, Collier 
(2008) argued that Sachs (2005) overplayed the importance of aid and wider range of policies - 
FDI. Easterly (2006) shares Moyo´s (2009) concerns, to introduce an alternative to the “Big 
Push” model, highlighting the importance of piecemeal interventions: setting incentives for aid 
agencies,  finding particular interventions through emphasis on independent evaluation of aid 
projects. Hence, in Moyo (2009) she presents original development approaches whereby FDI is 
given  a  central  role  and  has  the  potential  to  become  part  of  the  solution  of  economic 
underdevelopment in Africa. 
 
Asiedu (2002) has already presented evidence that the average return on US investment to Africa 
is higher than to other developing countries for the period 1991-1996. According to the World 
Investment Report 2008, this trend steadily increased for  global FDI to Africa, as shown in 
Figure 1. Again, this would promote Africa´s position as a natural suitor of FDI, however a large 
portion of FDI ventures in Africa are closely linked to the extraction of natural resources (oil and 
base metals), associated with high revenues for private capital. However, in theory the marginal 
product  of  capital  is  subject  to  diminishing  returns  based  on  the  long-run  neoclassic  Solow 
model. It implies that every additional unit of capital will be less productive than the one before 
while  the  economy  moves  from  one  steady-state  level  to  another.  Therefore,  the  marginal 
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Figure 1. Rates of return on inward FDI to developing regions, 1995-2007  
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2008), World Investment Report 2008, p. 41. 
 
Hence, Africa has some serious growth potential due to their low stock of capital. The top ten 
FDI countries accounted for 82 percent of Africa´s FDI inflows mirroring the inequality of FDI 
distribution on the continent (UNCTAD, 2008). However, being poor does not necessarily give a 
country an advantage for FDI promotion. Subsequently, Africa is still unable to harness its return 
on  capital  potential,  as  long  resource-seeking  FDI  dominates,  rather  than  the  manufacturing 
sector, in which the low labour cost could be evidently exploited. According to Asiedu (2002), if 
FDI inflows are natural resource based, then the rate of return variable will not be significant. In 
addition,  without  the  framework  of  sound  infrastructure,  macroeconomic  stability  and  low 
transport  costs  the  return  on  capital  won’t  affect  multinational´s  willingness  to  set  up  a 
manufacturing entity in SSA. One exception is the natural resource sector, which story may be 
different  from  the  regular  path  of  determinants  of  FDI,  symbolized  by  recent  China´s  FDI 
commitment to Africa. 
 
Therefore, a crucial element of relevance establishes Chinese FDI into Africa which has been 
growing dramatically in recent years, revealed in Figure 2. From 2003 to 2008 FDI outflows 
from China into Africa increased from 75 to 5,491 million US$ (9.82 percent of total Chinese 
FDI outflows in 2008). If we exclude Asia that constitutes the region´s lion share of Chinese FDI 
inflows (78 percent in 2008), one notices that China relies more and more on Africa (Figure 2). 
In the last decade no country has made as big an impact on FDI flows into Africa as China with 
its  “going  out”  strategy.  The  “African  Silk  Road”  and  its  resource-seeking  FDI  (Broadman, 
2007) became the source to satisfy its voracious appetite for natural energy commodities, such as 
crude oil, metalliferous ores, timber, cotton and agriculture (biofuels). Hence, it is not surprising 
that the most populous country in the world accounted for 40 percent of global growth in oil 
demand over the past 4 years (Moyo, 2009). In fact, 60 percent of Africa´s exports to China are 
related to oil and minerals (Broadman, 2007).  
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Africa Europe
Latin America* North America
Oceania
 
*Latin  America  and  Caribbean  excluding  tax  havens  Cayman  Islands  and  British  Virgin  Islands  that  make  up 
98.67% of total Latin American FDI inflows in 2008. 
Source: Derived from China Trade in Services, Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
2008. 
 
China´s role in Africa is more pragmatic and commercial than of any other country practiced 
since  African  independence.  Through  their  economic  interests  China  improves  Africa´s 
infrastructure  by  investing  into  railways,  roads,  pipelines  and  hydropower,  becoming  a  real 
alternative to aid. Chinese FDI has also some challenges attached. The significant concentration 
of Chinese investment in nations like Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Nigeria and the Sudan where corruption is high led to serious concerns by OECD, IMF 
and World Bank. They fear that they won’t be able anymore to argue that corruption and civil 
war deters FDI (The Economist, 2008). Critics contend that the trade partnership with the Sudan, 
where in the region of Darfur died about 300,000 as result of fighting since 2003 and more than 
2.5 million have been displaced. China´s thirst for oil supports the military army indirectly in 
Darfur through FDI and trade revenues - guns for oil. Consequently, one wants to know how 
accurate the popular notion is that Chinese FDI into Africa does not pay attention to the rule of 
law  and  is  mainly  resource-seeking.  Given  that  China  is  contained  in  the  dataset  a  dummy 
variable approach of countries that received major Chinese FDI inflow is inadequate and will 
suffer multicollinearity. However, it will become important for the analysis of the relationship 
between natural resource-seeking FDI and institutional change in Section 4.3. 
 
 
3.  Theoretical Paradigms 
 
Theoretically, Africa should be FDI´s natural suitor, since foreign firms can profit from low 
labour  costs  comparatively  to  its  wages  in  the  home-country  and  Africa´s  high  investable 
opportunities.  Despite  a  comparative  advantage  in  labour  costs,  FDI  to  Africa  remains  low. 
Africa´s comparative advantage in labour costs is being swept away by high transportation costs, 
unskilled labour and low firm- and plant-level economies of scale. Hence, it is not surprising that DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    10 
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FDI to Africa has been mainly concentrated in sectors of natural resource endowments and in 
countries with a large market size. This leaves institutional policies and geography as a possible 
direct determinant of FDI to Africa. Asiedu (2002) confirms the trend of declining FDI flows to 
Africa by finding an adverse regional effect of being an African country. Therefore, Africa and 
developing countries underlie different determinants of FDI. Infrastructure development and a 
higher return on capital promote FDI flows to non-SSA developing countries, while for SSA 
these factors had no impact. Furthermore, policy reforms such as openness to trade have not been 
equally successful in Africa as in other developing countries. However, Asiedu (2002) did not 
control  for  geographic  variables  and  most  institutional  variables, such  as  political  instability 
remain insignificant, motivating the present approach. 
 
In  the  voluminous  literature  on  this  subject,  three  deep  dimensions  of  thoughts  stand  out, 
determining  directly  and  indirectly  income  levels:  exogenous  physical  geography  and 
endogenous factors, such as the quality of institutions and trade (Rodrik, 2003). 
 
3.1  Geography 
 
First, one “deep” determinant of income is physical geography. The scholars who pioneered 
global geographic inequality between countries were Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) that 
found that there exists a direct relationship between geography and economic growth, perfectly 
observable on a global map of GDP per capita. Geography has been important throughout history 
and may be associated closely with Europe´s economic growth (already pointed out by Fernand 
Braudel, 1972) and perhaps the “First Great Divergence” (the economic rise of Western Europe 
in the post 1500 period, due to institutional change in England and the Dutch Republic relative to 
the Spanish Empire and Portugal), partly through fundamental advantages in coastal (Atlantic) 
trade,  accessible rivers,  it´s temperate climate  and low disease occurrence (Acemoglu  et al., 
2005). 
 
Geography determines FDI flows to developing countries, in particular to SSA through high 
transport costs owed to large distances to core markets; tropical and hot climate accompanied by 
infectious disease burden (malaria) that lowers productivity severely. Subsequently, geography 
directly  affects  agricultural  output,  productivity  and  health.  Indirectly,  it  provokes  declining 
knowledge and technological diffusion highlighted by the low FDI inflows to SSA relative to 
non-SSA countries. Moreover, it affects the economy via the institutional framework (Gallup et 
al., 1999). A large share of FDI in Africa has gone to countries that are rich in natural resources. 
In particular in the mining sector of high-value minerals and petroleum Africa acts as a host to 
FDI, where lies according to Basu and Srinivasan (2002) vast future FDI growth potential. 
Morisset´s (2000) panel data and cross section estimations indicate that natural resources have 
been highly significant in attracting FDI, which mirrors the fact that 41 percent of FDI inflows to 
SSA in 1995-1998 went to four oil-exporting countries (Angola, Congo Republic, Equatorial 
Guinea and Nigeria). Another large stake was allocated to mineral resources, such as diamonds, 
gold, copper, cobalt and manganese (Pigato, 2000). Countries with abundant natural resources 
have  inevitably  attracted  FDI  regardless  of  the  country´s  institutions.  These  results  would 
downplay  the  benefits  of  institutional  improvement  in  SSA  countries  where  FDI  is  natural-
resource based and will be subject to proof. This hypothesis will be taken up in Section 4.3 to 
check whether FDI inflows and oil- and mineral-exporter status induce institutional change in 
developing countries. 
 
SSA´s geographic distance to European core markets results in high shipping costs. In particular, 
landlocked  African  countries  suffer  under  elevated  transport  costs. The  World  Trade  Report DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    11 
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2004 of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) revealed the existence of a negative correlation 
between  inland  transport  costs  and  the  quality  of  infrastructure  since  adequate  infrastructure 
facilitates production and reduces trade costs. Mody and Wheeler (1992), Asiedu (2002) as well 
as Naudé and Krugell (2007) found infrastructure (number of telephones per 1,000 population) 
as key to economic development and FDI inflows, since adequate infrastructure enhances the 
productivity of investment by which it encourages FDI flows. However, Asiedu (2002) found 
that infrastructure development encouraged FDI to non-SSA countries but showed no significant 
inflow-effect for SSA countries. Once again, she links this with the largely extractive natural 
resource  based  FDI  to  Africa.  Asiedu  (2002)  finds  the  per  capita  telephones  instrumental 
variable, capturing the infrastructural effect, unconvincing, given that a high proportion of FDI 
inflows  to  SSA  consists  of  natural  resource  exploitation.  For  natural  resource  extractive 
industries the availability of telecommunication may not be particularly relevant but the transport 
conditions of roads and railways to the ports for trade prove to be essential. The per capita 
telephone instrumental variable struggles to capture the quality of the transport network to which 
I will refer in detail in Section 4.1. 
 
African geographic landlocked countries face huge cost disadvantages owed to high shipping 
and insurance costs compared to sea-based countries. This is due to higher costs of overland 
transport in comparison to sea freight costs, since landlocked export freight must be transported 
both by land and sea. Transit railway and road-infrastructure connecting the inland economy and 
the neighbouring country´s port are especially poor in SSA. Fifteen of global 37 landlocked 
countries (29 non-European) are located in SSA. Ten out of these 15 landlocked SSA countries 
are rated among the 22 official countries with the lowest level of “human development” (UNDP, 
2008). This fits well with the findings of Limao and Venables (2001) that landlocked countries 
face a trade obstacle since their transportation costs on average are 50 percent higher than for 
equivalent coastal economies. Land transport, including road, rail transport and pipelines are 
found to be 7 times more costly than sea-transport. These results are not in line with the results 
of the relationship of the African landlocked variable and FDI inflows, estimated by Naudé and 
Krugell (2007). According to them, geography does not seem to have a direct influence on FDI 
flows  to  Africa  because  of  the  insignificance  of  their  geographic  explanatory  variables. 
However, good infrastructure quality is essential, because the more foreign firms will have to 
pay for imported intermediate commodities, due to high inland freight costs, the less they will 
receive  relatively  for  their  exports.  For  example,  Radelet  and  Sachs  (1998)  estimated  that 
landlocked  Rwanda,  Burundi  and  Malawi  face  181  percent,  228  percent  and  124  percent 
additional  costs,  respectively,  due  to  the  high  proportion  of  transit  road-transportation  when 
shipping its exports to Northern Europe from the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. In addition, 
Radelet and Sachs (1998) found that small differences in shipping costs, especially for vertical 
FDI  in  labour-intensive  manufacturing  (characterized  by  thin  profit-margins)  can  offset  the 
profitability of FDI into manufacturing. Therefore, for geographic disadvantaged economies it is 
complicated  to  integrate  into  global  markets  for  any  product  that  requires  a  great  deal  of 
transport.  Consequently,  geography  scares  off  manufacturing  which  is  the  most  reliable  and 
equitable driver of rapid development (Collier, 2008). The use of labour rather than land is the 
key-difference of development in Asia. 
These results are well in line with Redding and Venables (2004) who argue that more distant 
countries suffer a permanently market access penalty on their export sales. Moreover, they face 
additional costs on imported intermediate inputs due to their large distance to Western  core 
markets, framing a rather pessimistic picture for FDI inflows into SSA. 
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3.2  Institutions 
 
A second strand of literature centres on institutions, which highlights the importance of the rule 
of law, private property rights, independence of the judiciary, bureaucratic capacity, personal 
liberty and political stability. It is widely believed that institutions are an important determinant 
of economic development for Africa. Three papers above all (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly 
and Levine, 2003; and Rodrik et al., 2002) claim to show that the role of geography in explaining 
cross-country  patterns  of  income  per  capita  runs  predominantly  through  the  selection  of 
institutions, while a direct geographical effect on income remains modest. North and Thomas 
(1973)  claim  that  institutions  serve  as  preconditions  and  determinants  for  economic  growth, 
while in turn also arising endogenously as a by-product of economic development. 
 
Rodrik  et  al.  (2004)  have  identified  the  primacy  of  institutions  and  policy  reforms  as  key 
determinant for developing countries’ economic growth. This implies that institutional quality 
becomes an important determinant for FDI inflows. Policies that have been able to reduce the 
risk of investment improve the local business environment and enhance economic growth by the 
liberalization of trade. In turn, trade liberalization promotes FDI inflows. Morisset (2000), for 
example,  found  that  countries  with  sound  economic  policies  and  good  institutions  attracted 
substantially  more  FDI  relative  than  African  countries  with  bigger  local  markets  or  natural 
resource wealth. Natural resource scarce SSA countries, such as Mozambique and Uganda have 
been able to increase significantly their FDI inflow, which provides a positive perspective that 
any African country, given its geographic location, is able to attract FDI. In addition, Asiedu 
(2002) argues that openness to trade (sum of a country´s exports + imports divided by its GDP in 
national current prices) promotes FDI, although the marginal effect for SSA is less than for non-
SSA developing countries. She ascribes this outcome with the fact that openness is globally 
determining FDI and therefore many countries have implemented such liberal policies. Several 
other scholars also found that African countries that have liberalized their trade will attract FDI 
through a better investment climate (Morisset, 2000 and Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). In sum, this 
implies that countries that wish to promote more FDI need to increase their efforts in terms of 
economic integration. 
 
Jaspersen et al.´s (2000) African dummy remained significant throughout their regressions for 
the period 1990-94 regarding  risk ratings.  In particular, the risk of expropriation and policy 
reversal in African countries influenced firm´s investment decisions. They concluded that Africa 
has been a significantly less attractive host for multinationals due to the high risk ratings which 
mirror the poor macroeconomic fundamentals and political and social risk factors. Investors have 
been irrationally averse to place FDI in Africa. Asiedu (2002) attributes this strong effect to the 
nature of irreversible FDI that becomes a “costly adventure”, regarding the sunk costs of foreign 
firms resulting from possible expropriation and policy reversal. 
Kurtzman et al. (2004) found that every one-point increase in a country´s opacity index leads to a 
US$986 lower per capita income and a one percent decline in FDI/GDP. The opacity index is 
defined as the degree of a country´s lack of transparent, accurate and easily discernible practice 
concerning the governance of business, investment and government. A survey conducted by the 
World Bank (1997) that covered 3,600 firms in 69 countries, with the sample for SSA consisting 
of 540 foreign firms from 22 countries, showed that foreign firms do not trust SSA government 
policies and perceive them as being uncertain and “unpredictable” – corruption was important. 
Factors such as good governance and the rule of law become meaningless in the absence of trust 
(hard  to  define  and  measure),  deeply  settled  into  investor´s  thinking  about  Africa´s  history. 
Additionally, high risk ratings of commercial agencies combined with a lack of knowledge of the 
continent, impedes FDI. Africa´s bad reputation also stems from the fact that it has been treated DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    13 
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as  one  large  country  instead  of  focusing  on  a  country  by  country  based  approach.  Another 
serious constraint to FDI is the large bureaucratic barrier in African countries, which makes the 
procedure of acquiring a business license a time-costly mission for foreign firms (Moyo, 2009). 
The  previous  results  are not  in  line  with  Asiedu´s  (2002)  insignificant  “political  instability” 
variable that expresses the risk of investing in  an African country. However, Asiedu (2002) 
argued that it were the resource-rich African, political unstable countries that attracted major FDI 
inflows which explains the insignificance of the independent variable. 
 
However,  the  feedback-mechanism  of  resource-seeking  FDI  on  institutional  quality  remains 
unexplored in the African FDI literature and therefore requires detailed focus in Section 4.3. 
Empirical examples reveal an ambivalent scene, since all SSA oil-producing countries are/were 
trapped in the “resource curse”, while there are a couple of mineral-endowed countries, such as 
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia, that have been able to prevent a “resource-curse” through 
the implementation of their mining sectors (diamonds, gold and copper) in sound government 
management. Additionally, countries that have less natural wealth commodities have been able 
to attract FDI by improvements of their institutional quality. The case of Madagascar offers a 
two-sided institutional response. Madagascar established an export processing zone in the late 
1990s,  mainly  driven  by  sound  policy  reforms;  as  a  result  300,000  jobs  were  created  by 
multinational firms. However, when in 2002 civil war broke out and the port was blockaded the 
previous  FDI  success  story  devoted  to  good  governance  was  decimated  and  multinationals 
moved their production to Asia. Only, 40,000 FDI-jobs remained in Madagascar. This leaves 
room for optimism that fixed geographic constraints attributed to low FDI levels must not be 
destiny but can be overcome by institutional enhancement. 
 
Other studies by Naudé and Krugell (2007) do not verify a direct influence of geography on FDI, 
while  almost  all  institutional  variables  indicated  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  FDI 
attraction for Africa. Furthermore, Sachs and Sievers (1998) see political stability as one of the 
crucial determinants of FDI location in Africa. Given the presence of competition for FDI among 
developing countries a multinational firm would choose a country in which market uncertainty is 
lower.  Several  scholars  have  argued  that  global  competition  for  FDI  within  the  wave  of 
globalisation has intensified. Among developing countries’ locations, multinational firms have a 
wide  production  choice.  Since  the  1980s  Asia  stands  out  as  global  manufacturing  hub 
(Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006; Pigato, 2000; Asiedu, 2002 and 2003). Precisely, an explosive 
shift (outsourcing or delocalization) of manufacturing from the US and Europe to Asia occurred 
during the past 3 decades. 
 
Particularly,  the  economic  and  institutional  differences  between  Africa  and  other  developing 
countries remain high, which explains the relative low investment flows to Africa for which the 
African  natural  resource  sector  remains  the  exception.  Collier  (2008)  argues  that  African 
counties are locked into resource-seeking FDI (to China) twice over by the threshold effects of 
Asian export agglomerations and cost-competitiveness. Hence, low wages and spatial economies 
of scale in manufacturing attract largely manufacturing FDI to Asia. Breaking in private capital 
is more complex for Africa than before Asia managed to become a global manufacturing-hub.  
The theory of economic development starts off with agricultural development (SSA), followed 
by industrial manufacturing. This step is important because manufacturing and service exports 
offer a much better perspective of sustainable and rapid development, making use of labour 
instead of land. In practice, Asia experienced a transition from commodity exporter to scaling the 
manufacturing ladder. Latin American countries are in between these 2 stages. Predominantly, 
Europe and the US make up the services and R&D third economic development stage. This 
historical economic development ladder has been proven the same for FDI development. DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    14 
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Acemoglu  et  al.  (2001)  rediscovered  the  historical  importance  of  institutions  on  per  capita 
income to account for the different colonizing policies with diverse associated institutions. They 




centuries  (Helpman,  2004).  In  locations  where  Europeans  faced  high  mortality  rates  they 
installed extractive institutions that still persist and influence economic performance. Krugell 
and Naudé (2007) estimated “settler mortality” to be significant while having only a marginal 
impact on FDI/GDP in Africa. Moreover, it may be possible that geographic variables (climate, 
diseases and hostile locals) caused high settler mortality rates and still inhibit growth today. 
Analogously,  the  importance  of  well  developed  pre-colonial  state  hierarchy  for  present-day 
governance quality in African countries found recent support (Spear, 2003 and Bolt and Smits, 
presented at a seminar in front of the “research group Social and Economic History” of Utrecht 
University, Utrecht 12/02/2009). Therefore, this paper does not control for mortality rates of 
European settlers and will capture it by other institutional indexes as provided by Kaufmann et 
al. (2008). 
 
Many factors are important in influencing a firm´s choice of FDI. Earlier works by Brainard 
(1997)  and  Wheeler  and  Mody  (1992)  reveal  that  tax-differentials  and  tax-incentives  on 
investment  location  are  minimal  relative  to  other  host-country´s  assets.  On  the  other  hand, 
taxation policies, as argued by Naveretti and Venables (2004) are of increasing importance since 
competition  for  FDI  is  high  between  developing  economies.  Furthermore,  tax  incentives  in 
Africa found by Basu and Srinivasan (2002) have been regarded by investors, seeking to locate 
their affiliates abroad as irrelevant in comparison to the “African factor” and natural resource 
endowments. Due to the above reasoning for SSA, and the lack of data on corporate taxes for 
most developing countries, this paper ignores tax-policy variables in the econometric stage. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
The dataset is a panel of annual economic data from 1997 until 2006 and covers 72 developing 
countries  of  which  37  are  African  (33  SSA),  22  Latin  American  and  13  Asian  developing 
countries  (Appendix  Table  1).  The  dataset  contains  a  number  of  geographic,  policy  and 
institutional variables. A full description of the variables and their characteristics is provided in 
Table 2. The data sources may be reviewed in Table 3 of the Appendix. The analysis uses 
Asiedu´s (2002) country grouping selection while adding 2 countries. The sample size for SSA 
countries has been extended in view of testing whether FDI went to natural resources in SSA and 
its  implication  on  the  institutional  framework.  Hence,  2  major  oil-exporting  countries  that 
received major FDI inflows, namely, Angola and the Sudan were added to Asiedu´s (2002) 
original sample. Asiedu (2002) most likely excluded those countries due to the lack of data. 
However, a more current approach offers statistical information. The dataset is complete for each 
country  and  therefore  has  no  missing  values.  For  the  cross  section  estimation  there  are  72 
observations and 216 respectively for the panel data set. 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the dependent and explanatory variables of the analysis and their expected 
impact on net inflows of FDI as a share of GDP. Regrettably, data on real wages are unavailable 
for most developing countries, in particular SSA. 
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Table 2. Variables and their possible effect on FDI 
 
Variable Abbreviation Measure Prediction
FDI as share of GDP* fdigdp % of GDP
GDP growth rate growth Percentage change +
Openness to trade open % of GDP +/-
Return on capital return 1/GDP per capita +
Infrastructure = number of 
telephones per 100 population
tel Per 100 population +
Inflation rate inflation Percentage rate of change in price 
levels
-
Money and quasi money (M2) as 
% of GDP
m2gdp % of GDP +
Rule of law rule Rating from -2.5 to 2.5 +
Absence of conflict conflict Rating from -2.5 to 2.5 +
HIPC = highly indebted poor 
country
hipc Dummy variable = 1 if HIPC
country, 0 otherwise
+
Bureaucracy = time required to 
start a business
time Days -
>33% export revenues from fuels  oil Dummy variable = 1 if oil-
exporter, otherwise 0
+
>33% export revenues from 
minerals
mineral Dummy variable = 1 if mineral-
exporter, otherwise 0
+
Landlocked landlocked Dummy variable = 1 if landlocked
country, 0 otherwise
-
Distance to the equator dfe Latitude/90 +
Land area landarea km
2/1,000,000 +/-




As is standard in the literature, the dependent variable is the share of net FDI inflows of the 
country´s  national  GDP.  This  measure  is  obtained  from  the  World  Development  Indicators 
(WDI) of the World Bank. 
 
Policy  
Openness measures total trade as a percentage of GDP, referring to the sum of exports and 
imports divided by GDP in national current prices. Nevertheless, there are several problems 
associated with this openness index, since trade is endogenous to geography. Trade volumes 
depend on other values than policy measures, such as endowments, market and supplier access, 
technologies and possibly conflicts (Helpman 2004, p. 72). Frankel and Romer (1999) found a 
strong effect of their specifically constructed openness index on income per capita with which 
they solved for the endogeneity problem. According to them, a rise of one percentage point in 
the trade/GDP ratio raises income per capita by 2 percent, spurring accumulation of physical and 
human capital (Frankel and Romer, 1999, p. 394) which may be relevant for FDI. Furthermore, 
in the case of high trade restrictions (less openness) foreign firms with market-seeking intentions 
may  employ  the  “tariff  jumping”  strategy  when  it  becomes  costly  to  import  the  products. 
Subsequently, trade restrictions may encourage FDI in this particular case. Market-seeking FDI 
for my SSA sample will be less important, therefore I hypothesize a positive correlation between 
openness and FDI. However, for other developing countries where there is a greater market-
seeking potential, the coefficient may be lower. DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    16 
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As a standard infrastructure proxy, telephones lines per 100 population in a country is used. 
Good infrastructure stimulates productivity of investment and therefore attracts FDI. However, 
the variable only captures the availability of infrastructure but falls short regarding its reliability. 
For foreign investors the availability of infrastructure becomes less important than its reliability, 
since  no  profit-seeking  firm  can  afford  to  bet  on  a  country´s  unreliable  power  and 
telecommunications  network.  However,  data  on  the  reliability  of  telecommunications  is  not 
available because data on the frequency of power outrages for most countries in my sample is 
unavailable. Another problem associated with this variable represents the increased amount of 
households  that  switched  to  mobile  phones,  substituting  the  phone  line  which  reduces  the 
significance of the infrastructure proxy. Albeit imperfect, I apply this infrastructure proxy, which 
is the best we have.  
 
International firms invest in countries offering high return on investments. As touched upon in 
Section 2, the return on capital in Africa is higher than for other developing countries. The 
paper faces difficulties to implement such a measure of return on capital since the majority of 
developing countries in the sample, does not have well-functioning capital markets. This work 
uses the ln of the inverse of real GDP per capita as utilized by Jaspersen et al. (2000) and Asiedu 
(2002). The inverse relationship finds its explanation in the Solow-Model where the marginal 
product  of  capital  is  subject  to  diminishing  returns  in  the  long-run.  It  implies  that  every 
additional unit of capital will be less productive than the one before, while the economy moves 
from one steady-state level to another. Therefore, Africa has some serious growth potential due 
to their low stock of capital. 
 
GDP growth rate serves as a proxy for demand growth. In the literature, Schneider and Frey 
(1985) found a positive relationship between real GDP per capita and FDI/GDP. They argued 
that a higher real GDP per capita in the host country implies better prospects for market-seeking 
FDI. I hypothesize that for SSA, where FDI goes mainly to natural resources, which is non-
market-seeking the effect of economic growth on FDI will be insignificant. The inflation rate 
measures the general economic stability of the country. As a measure of financial depth I use the 
ratio of liquid liabilities (M2) to GDP. 
 
Institutions 
The decision to present the governance indicator the “rule of law” is a logic response to measure 
the confidence of agents into the rules of society, the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, judicial quality as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, all important for FDI 
promotion (chapter 3.2). These informative indicators are provided by Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
They report the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), measuring six 
dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2007, drawn from 35 different data bases from 32 
different world organisations. Second, the conflict variable political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism  measures  the  perception  of  the  likelihood  that  the  government  will  be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism (Kaufmann et al., 2008). Additionally, the debt reduction initiative HIPC 
(highly  indebted  poor  countries)  of  World  Bank  and  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
functions  as  another  rough  measurement  of  good  governance  performance  (or  less  bad 
governance) of highly indebted countries. Of the current 41 HIPC member countries, I selected 
the ones that have reached the completion and decision points for the dummy variable approach. 
The initiative cancels bilateral and multilateral debts when governments ex-ante conditional have 
improved their governance to avoid moral hazard for debt relief (IMF, 2007). As a measure of 
bureaucratic quality the paper applies the time required to start a business measured in days.  DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    17 
 




As geographical variables, dummies are being plugged in for major natural resource-exporting 
countries for which the exports of oil or minerals constitute more than one third of total export 
revenue. It will be interesting to see whether in SSA FDI has gone in general to resource rich 
countries as many predecessors have found. 
 
Most  geographic  analyses  stress  the  impact  of  climate,  geographical  isolation  and  disease 
environment. I included a dummy for landlocked countries to see whether unfavourable physical 
geographic locations, regarding coastal trade, distance to core markets and consequently high 
transportation  costs  have  a  negative  impact  on  FDI  inflows  in  such  countries.  As  a  rough 
measure of climate, I use the distance from the equator, measured as the absolute value of 
latitude in degrees divided by 90 to place it on a 0 to 1 scale. Some scholars use distance from 
the equator as an instrumental variable to account for income per capita. Empirical evidence 
presented by Hall and Jones (1997) and Bloom et al. (1998) found that a country´s distance from 
the equator is positively associated with income per capita. Others tried to capture the effect of 
tropical  infectious  and  parasitic  diseases  environment  predominantly  malaria,  which  lowers 
productivity considerably (Bloom et al., 1998). This is due to that the equator represents a zone 
of  intense  year-round  rainfall,  high  temperature  and  no  freezing,  nurturing  diseases.  The 
percentage of country area lying in the tropics is an additional variable to account for tropical 
climate and affectedness of malaria. Land area divided by a million measures the magnitude of 
a country. 
 
4.2  Empirical Results 
 
In this section the empirical results are reported and plausible explanations for each result are 
provided (STATA 9.2). Additionally, I describe the econometric method I used to assess the 
relationship between the selected “determinants” and FDI inflows. The estimation results and the 
robust standard errors are reported in Table 4. I first use panel data (Column 1-4) for which the 
variables  have  been  averaged  over  3  sub-periods:  1997-1999,  2000-2002  and  2003-2006. 
Second, I use cross section data (Column 5), employing the computed averages of the variables 
over the period 1997-2006. In Table 2 of the Appendix the summary statistics for the full sample 
is provided. 
 
The  combined  panel  estimation  results  in  Column  4  indicate  that  policy,  institutional  and 
geographic factors determine FDI/GDP to both SSA and other developing countries. As a group 
these factors explain around 43 percent of the variability in FDI/GDP. And for the cross-section 
estimation the R
2 in Column 5 is quite high at 56 percent. Formally, the 5 percent critical value 
for the Hausman test, in this case with 8 degrees of freedom is 15.51 which is higher than the 
Hausman statistic of 8.87 (or indeed higher than any other critical value). Therefore, I reject the 
H1 hypothesis of a fixed effects model in favour of the H0 hypothesis, which indicates that a 
random effects model is the most appropriate one, capturing the binary variables in my sample. 
The discussion of the results is based on the panel estimation results in Column 4, given that the 
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Table 3. Differences between SSA and non-SSA countries (means of selected variables)  
 
Variables SSA Non-SSA
100 * (FDI/GDP) 3.391 3.707
Openness to trade = 100 * (Imports + Exports)/GDP 76.418 84.296
Infrastructure = ln(phones per 100 population) 2.318 4.396
Return on capital = ln(1/GDP per capita) -6.237 -7.537
Growth rate 1.550 2.259
Rule of Law -0.677 -0.267
Absence of Conflict -0.461 -0.416
Distance from the equator -0.001 0.093
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Table 4: Random Effects Model estimation  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Policy Institutions Geography Combined OLS robust
0.587 3.957*** 12.477*** -1785 -0.663





















0.517 -0.040 -0.846 2192 5211




























2 0.2849 0.0399  0.0711 0.4293 0.5587
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 72
Distance from the equator  * SSA


























(1-4) Panel data estimation 1997-1999; 2000-2002; 2003-2006, (5) Cross-section estimation 1997-2006 
(Robust p-values in parentheses) 
* Significance at the 0.10 level. 
** Significance at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significance at the 0.01 level. DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    20 
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(i)  Result 1 
The period 1997-2006 reveals no negative SSA-effect on FDI/GDP. 
 
In Column 4 of Table 4 the statistically insignificant estimate for the dummy variable SSA 
suggests that there is no clear adverse SSA-effect. When reducing the regression equation to 
policy indicators (openness, return on capital and infrastructure development) as used by Asiedu 
(2002), the SSA dummy variable remains still insignificant. Hence, one can observe a distinct 
comparative change of FDI inflows into SSA between Asiedu´s (2002) period of 1988-1997 and 
this works´ more recent period of 1997-2006. 
 
There  are  two  plausible  explanations  for  this  result.  First,  during  the  past  decade  SSA 
experienced increased resource-seeking FDI, driven by SSA immense natural resource wealth. 
However,  manufacturing  FDI  felt  short  in  view  of  inadequate  infrastructure  and  institutions 
(Result 4 and 5), that form an inherently risky business environment for value-added FDI in 
manufacturing.  Hence,  in  SSA  FDI  inflows  increased  significantly  during  the  past  decade 
relative to other developing countries, due to their major oil and mineral production and scattered 
manufacturing  sites.  The  increased  foreign  investment  in  natural  resources  may  explain  the 
marginal difference between the average of FDI/GDP in SSA and non-SSA countries, as shown 
in Table 3. On average, the difference of FDI/GDP between SSA and non-SSA regions for 
1997-2006, in comparison with Asiedu´s period 1988-1997 reduced remarkably. While for the 
period 1988-1997 FDI/GDP for SSA was 0.885 and 2.467 for non-SSA (Asiedu, 2002), in 1997-
2006 FDI/GDP for SSA was 3.391 and amounted to 3.707 for non-SSA (Table 3). Although, 
SSA still attracts less FDI relative to non-SSA, the not statistically different average mirrors the 
increased importance of FDI to SSA.  
 
Second, SSA has improved its infrastructure, institutions and liberalised its trade framework, 
which  has  attracted  some  primitive  manufacturing  industries,  in  particular  in  countries  like 
Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa. However, in a competitive globalized economy SSA 
still cannot live up to its potential, since improvements have to be made both in absolute and 
relative terms (Asiedu, 2003). In view of non-SSA countries´ relative progress, SSA still limps 
behind. Collier (2008) predicted that SSA countries will have to wait for quite a long time until 
economic development in Asia will enlarge the wage-gap with SSA, comparable to the gap that 
existed between Asia and the Western industrial countries around 1980. For now this particular 
process  that  drove  Asian  development  hampers  analogously  FDI-development  into 
manufacturing businesses for SSA. 
 
Hence, the subsequent results provide hope that there occurred an absolute rise in FDI/GDP for 
most SSA countries in the past decade in comparison with the former decade. However, this 
increase in FDI/GDP may be due to increased demand for resource-seeking FDI in SSA which 
has potential negative implications on institutional quality and future manufacturing FDI, in view 
of the shadows of the “resource curse” (see Section 4.3). 
 
(ii)  Result 2 
Openness to trade promotes FDI to both SSA and non-SSA countries, however the marginal 
benefit from increased openness is higher for SSA. 
 
This result suggests that SSA countries profit three-fold more from trade liberalization than non-
SSA  countries,  when  summing  the  SSA  and  non-SSA  coefficients  of  0.053  and  0.023 
respectively. Also, it does not conflict with Asiedu´s (2002) opposite findings, since she focused 
on an earlier time period of 1988-1997, while this work considers a more recent period of 1997-DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    21 
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2006. It suggests that is was more rewarding to liberalize for SSA in the late 1990s than in 
previous years. Hence, policy recommendations suggested by Asiedu´s (2002) results that SSA 
countries  need  to  liberalise  their  markets  for  trade,  yielded  fruit,  since  SSA  countries  have 
largely proliferated their policy environments in a positive way in the last decade. In particular 
former trade policies that hampered openness  were  reversed  (Collier and Gunning, 1999) in 
order to enhance future growth. The results may actually capture the successful implementation 
of these liberal trade policies, for example the efforts of inter-regional economic integration in 
SSA, targeted to reduce inter-country trade barriers. Here, I consider the SSA trading blocs of 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), active since 2000 and the 
East African Community (EAC), in force since 2005 as having played a constructive role. 
 
Dimaranan et al. (2008) assesses that the intra-regional trade between COMESA members is 
rather low and the member countries rely heavily on third countries as sources of imports and as 
export  destinations,  hence  intra-country  trade  may  be  spurred.  Furthermore,  it  enhances  the 
possibility of the occurrence of growth spillovers from SSA member states. In particular for 
landlocked SSA countries man-made or political geography may be a winning strategy to lower 
transport costs, increase market  and supplier access and improve infrastructure  coordination, 
while lessening geographic inequality in SSA. Trade and currency unions have the potential to 
increase neighbourhood growth spillovers, improve neighbour´s economic policies and coastal 
access for landlocked states, hence creating a transparent and investor-friendly environment for 
FDI. 
 
Second, Millennium conditional debt relief, another form of  aid conditionality of the World 
Bank´s HIPC initiative set off trade reforms and improved macroeconomic stability in eligible 
SSA countries. Also, the thirst for and trade of SSA natural resources, such as oil and minerals 
increased drastically during the past decade relative to previous periods, which has been captured 
by the positive openness variable and anticipated by foreign investors. In particular, the recent 
“resource scramble for Africa” of Asian countries, such as China, India and Russia increased the 
coefficient of openness. Nevertheless, greater openness led to higher trade and FDI flows but 
these have been mainly aimed at to the natural resource sector. To attract additional FDI into 
manufacturing  rather  than  relying  on  extractive  FDI,  SSA  countries  must  not  only  improve 
economic policies (as they did with openness) but also institutional principles and infrastructure 
reliability to close the gap to Asian manufacturers. 
 
There is a threat for SSA that economic history repeats itself, as new world colonies “priming the 
pump” of European economies, such as England in 1800. At that time England obtained its 
grain,  sugar  (for  calories)  and  cotton  (for  clothing)  from  their  colonial  “ghost  acres”,  being 
almost twice as large in volume as their own national arable land (Pomeranz, 2000). In 2009, 
China needs to feed approximately 20 percent of the world population with only 7 percent of the 
world´s arable land. Hence, they are naturally looking abroad for energy resources, investing into 
SSA´s “garden”. However, in the near future international trade and SSA-fixation with China 
might keep away sustained manufacturing businesses and isolate the SSA status to only a natural 
commodity exporter in the long-term, while serving an expanding Chinese and Asian resource 
market,  in  view  of  economic  and  demographic  growth.  History  has  shown  that  hardly  any 
country on earth became sustainable developed by only relying on its natural exports alone. 
 
(iii)  Result 3 
Higher returns on capital have no significant impact on FDI/GDP inflows to both SSA and non-
SSA. 
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Economic  growth  was  excluded  as  an  explanatory  variable  from  the  regression,  shown  in 
Column 4, since there is a high degree of correlation between economic growth and returns on 
investment/capital  which was  constructed  as  the  inverse  of  GDP per  capita.  Since  GDP  per 
capita and the growth rate of GDP per capita are highly collinear, the resulting multicollinearity 
problem may change the coefficient of the independent variables erratically in response to small 
changes in the model.  
 
The insignificance of return on capital for FDI in SSA may be plausibly explained by two facts. 
First, FDI in SSA is largely resource-seeking, channeled into oil and mining sectors. In primary 
resource  industries  low  local  wages  are  not  taken  advantage  of  as  much  as  its  practice  in 
manufacturing businesses in non-SSA countries. Subsequently, FDI in natural resources is not 
determined by  returns to capital than equivalent FDI in high-tech manufacturing or services 
(Navaretti and Venables, 2004). According to Asiedu (2002), if FDI inflows are natural resource 
based, then the rate of return variable will not be significant. Second, in a risky environment, 
higher returns do not translate into more investment but deters it. The uncertainty of government 
policy and poor infrastructure has a negative impact on private investment even though return on 
business´ capital may be theoretically higher in SSA than in non-SSA. The “advantage to be 
poor” via lower wages cannot be exploited, if SSA is still performing under the institutional and 
infrastructure threshold relative to non-SSA countries. 
 
It remains a puzzle why higher returns on investment for non-SSA countries do not lead to 
increased FDI inflows, as theory robustly predicts. The inverse of real GDP per capita may be a 
fragile  and  imperfect  proxy  for  return  on  capital.  There  are  3  plausible  explanations  to  this 
puzzle. The first is that sustained GDP per capita growth in non-SSA implies better prospects for 
market-seeking FDI. However, the higher per capita income yields, the lower will be the inverse 
of GDP per capita as proxy for return on capital. Therefore, the imperfect proxy does not capture 
the  recent  effects  of  market-seeking  FDI,  which  supports  the  insignificance  of  the  estimate. 
Second, the return to capital effect may be captured through the rule of law (variable) which 
induces growth and FDI inflows (Result 4) for non-SSA countries. Since, the return on capital 
proxy is constructed as  the inverse of  GDP per capita it  will be sensitively  related to GDP 
growth. Third, the return on capital is a long-run designed, financial measure due to diminishing 
returns to labour and capital in the long-run, while this paper is embedded in a medium-run 
analysis of a ten-year period. 
 
The SSA question is whether return on capital through primary resources can be channeled into 
sustained  return  on  investment,  economic  growth,  diversified  industries  and  improved 
governance quality in the future. In that case, higher return on capital should boost future FDI 
inflows in SSA.  
 
(iv)  Result 4 
The rule of law promotes FDI to non-SSA countries, but has no significant impact on FDI flows 
to SSA countries. 
 
Non-SSA countries benefit from increased FDI inflows when the quality of the legal-political 
regime  improves.  In  non-SSA  developing  countries,  institutions  act  as  preconditions  and 
determinants of FDI inflows and economic growth. Policies that have been able to reduce the 
risk of investment in non-SSA countries enhance the local business environment and increase 
regional FDI inflows. 
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According to Asiedu (2003), the degree of SSA policy development is only mediocre compared 
to reforms, implemented in other developing countries. Despite SSA´s absolute progress on the 
quality  of  the  rule  of  law,  in  relative  terms  they  have  been  thin  (Table  3),  given  that  the 
developing world has become more competitive and integrated, underlined by the insignificance 
of  the  rule  of  law  variable  for  SSA.  Investors  have  been  irrationally  averse  to  place 
manufacturing FDI in Africa, attributing on the nature of irreversible FDI that becomes a costly 
and risky adventure of foreign firms, resulting from low institutional development. 
 
SSA countries with abundant natural resources have inevitably attracted FDI/GDP, regardless of 
their country´s institutions (rule of law). These  results downplay the benefits of institutional 
improvement  in  SSA  countries.  However,  when  major  institutional  improvements,  as  for 
example in Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana were realized, non-
resource based FDI was the result. According to Basu and Srinivasan (2002), resource-scarce 
Mozambique and Uganda attracted investors by their long-term commitment to macroeconomic 
stability and market-friendly environment. This case study based analysis “à la Rodrik” reveals 
that  institutional  enhancement  of  the  rule  of  law  yields  fruit  for  FDI  into  second  industry 
branches of manufacturing and services. Morisset (2000) for example, found that countries with 
sound economic policies and good institutions attracted more FDI flows than African countries 
with bigger local markets or natural resources. Therefore, natural-resource scarce SSA countries, 
such as Mozambique and Uganda have been able to increase significantly their FDI flows that 
provide a positive perspective that any African country, given its geographic reality is able to 
attract FDI. 
 
However, as we have seen through the lenses of the econometric estimation, it’s still the natural 
resource  sector  that  papers  over  the  institutional importance  of SSA, in  which  the  utility  of 
natural commodities stand above institutional preconditions, being part of the “resource curse”. 
Conversely,  future  sustained  growth  and  FDI  inflows  in  SSA,  by  means  of  industry 
diversification will hinge on the relative progress of institutions compared to the rest of the 
developing world. 
 
Next  in  Section  4.3,  I  am  interested  in  the  reverse  relationship  or  feedback  mechanism  of 
FDI/GDP  on  institutional  quality,  analyzing  whether  FDI  inflows  have  the  same  impact  on 
institutional quality in SSA and other developing countries. 
 
(v)  Result 5 
Infrastructure development promotes FDI to non-SSA countries, but has no significant impact on 
FDI streams to SSA. 
 
This may be explained by 2 motivations. First, FDI to SSA is largely natural resource based, 
predominantly in capital-intensive extractive industries. For example, the 24 African countries 
classified by the World Bank as oil- and mineral-dependent have, on average, accounted for 
three quarters of annual FDI flows over the past two decades (UNCTAD, 2005). Furthermore, in 
2003  the  top  4  SSA  countries  that  received  FDI  flows  were  all  major  petroleum-exporters, 
namely:  Angola,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Nigeria  and Sudan.  Second,  infrastructure  development, 
especially the availability of telephones is less relevant for natural resource-based FDI. Indeed, 
foreign firms investing into an extractive SSA industry do not expect to find access to power 
supply and water in isolated distant exploration sites. When the utility of natural resources is 
higher than their associated costs, the use of private generators solves for shortages of electricity 
for  extractive  FDI.  However,  an  underdeveloped  transport  infrastructure  results  into  soaring 
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the  World  Bank  revealed  that  there  exists  a  negative  correlation  between  the  quality  of 
infrastructure and inland transport costs. In sum, although for the exploration of natural resources 
infrastructure  might  not  be  essential  for  FDI,  but  for  its  transportation,  weak  transport 
infrastructure, as unpaved and pot-holed roads, lack of railways and bridges enlarge transport 
costs considerably, consequently reducing trade and FDI in future non-resource segments. 
 
It´s importance is highlighted by China´s heavy investment into infrastructure development in 
SSA, building roads in Ethiopia, pipelines in Sudan, railways in Nigeria and power in Ghana 
(Moyo, 2009). Chinese FDI is directed to the construction of the road and rail networks in SSA. 
Once  again,  as  suggested  by  Result  4,  this  proves  that  raw-materials  are  on  a  large-scale 
transported away instead of experiencing local processing, subsequently explaining SSA´s low 
FDI in manufacturing. However, there is hope that the development curve of SSA will pick up 
due  to  Chinese  investment  into  SSA  infrastructure,  employing  local  labour  and  reducing 
transport costs for future trade and FDI. At the same time scholars, like Moyo (2009) and Collier 
(2008) are concerned that SSA will be highly receptive to Chinese cheaper import manufacturing 
goods  that  may  undercut  SSA´s  potential  to  build  on  diversified  manufacturing  industries. 
Moreover, it may threaten existing manufacturing jobs, subsequently isolating SSA furthermore 
from manufacturing  associated FDI, as discussed in Result 2. Many SSA countries however 
welcome  Chinese  FDI,  since  it  appears  that  in  poor  SSA  countries  the  future  plays  a  less 
important role because for many countries it’s about “survival” today – not tomorrow. 
 
For non-SSA high income developing countries a reliable transport and power infrastructure is 
indispensable in addition to an adequate telecommunication network, given that their type of FDI 
is mainly market-based and directed to manufacturing and services. Hence, the infrastructure 
development coefficient for non-SSA is positive and on average twice as high relative to SSA 
(Table 3). 
 
(vi)  Result 6 
Oil-exporting status in SSA and non-SSA countries has no significant impact on FDI inflows - 
not in line with previous case studies. 
 
Historically, resource endowments used as energy sources, like coal and iron ore were central to 
the Industrial Revolution in the late 18
th century and Western Europe´s subsequent economic 
development. Europe´s largest deposits were located in Britain, Germany and Belgium in the late 
18
th century. However, in the past decades resource-abundance status has not lived up to its 
historical potential, but is closely related to civil conflicts and unfulfilled economic growth in 
developing  countries.  Oil-exporters  have  had  historically  high  levels  of  foreign  ownership 
(control) of their key resource because oil-exploitation from the start required unusually high 
levels  of  capital,  drilling  technology  and  know-how  which  developing  petro-states  did  not 
possess (Karl, 1997). 
 
Although recognized by scholars (Pigato, 2000 and Morisset, 2000) that FDI into SSA is mainly 
directed to resource-rich countries, the interaction term for SSA oil-exporting countries remains 
insignificant, even though oil-rich Angola and Sudan were added to the sample. In fact from 
1990 to 2005, oil production in Africa rose from 6.5 to 9.3 million barrels per day - accounting 
for over 11 percent of world production in 2005 (UNCTAD, 2006). 
 
A possible answer to this puzzle may be that the “resource curse” that is closely connected with 
increased conflict potential and corrupt institutions that scare off diversified FDI. Hence, FDI in 
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petrochemical,  petroleum  refining  and  plastic  industry  branches  have  not  been  targeted  by 
foreign investors in such countries. The example of Saudi-Arabia shows that good governance 
and absence of risk of civil violence has the potential to establish a new industry linked to oil, 
where petrochemical and plastic manufacturing has become quite active. 
 
It´s an important policy implication that institutional improvement in natural resource abundant 
developing  countries has the potential to bring  about a second FDI-wave, in diversified oil-
related industries. Hence, for FDI into oil-related industries a safer institutional environment is 
vital and can become a way out of the “resource curse”, if being accompanied by non-oil based 
fiscal  policies,  education  and  a  diversified  industry  in  competitive  sectors,  as  for  instance, 
tourism (Section 5).  
 
Contrary, in developing countries and in particular in SSA, where the institutional environment 
has not reached such threshold level, multinational firms are scared off by civil conflict and the 
high  risk  of  expropriation  and  policy  reversal.  Subsequently,  the  crude  oil  and  minerals  are 
traded and transported away, along with later processing at home instead of being processed 
locally in the developing country. However, the “resource flight” today, may explain why the 
marginal benefit of openness is higher for SSA countries, if natural-resources are mainly traded 
away  rather  than  being  processed  in  the  region  itself,  mirroring  the  legal,  bureaucratic  and 
conflict risk restriction for non-resource-seeking FDI – prohibiting the second (manufacturing) 
FDI wave. Hence, Result 6 has the potential to reduce the shiny Result 2 of openness. However, 
since  most  of  the  SSA  oil-producers  are  still  quite  young  relative  to  other  oil-producing 
developing countries, such as Venezuela. There is hope that time may bring diversification into 
value added oil-related industries. 
 
(vii)  Result 7 
Geography - greater distance from the equator has no impact on FDI for SSA and non-SSA 
countries. However, larger SSA countries in terms of land area attracted more FDI. 
 
This would be a novelty since there are hardly any papers that were able to prove that geography 
impacts on firm´s decisions to invest in developing countries. The recent work by Krugell and 
Naudé (2007) failed to find this direct relationship. Analogously, my results do not point out 
geography as a direct and strong determinant of FDI in developing countries. 
 
SSA countries further away from the equator have not received higher FDI/GDP flows. Theory 
does  not  find  quantitative  support  for  both  SSA  and  non-SSA  countries.  However,  the 
explanations are different. Primary, SSA FDI is resource-based for which the location of these 
resources are secondary, since natural resources are located randomly over the surface of the 
earth and do not follow a geographic scheme. However, when checking on a map, manufacturing 
FDI is clustered further away from the equator in SSA. This observation can be made by the 
geographic  FDI  poles  of  South  Africa,  Mauritius  and  Botswana,  all  located  in  the  south  of 
Africa, representing the FDI hubs in manufacturing and services, textile production and mineral 
extraction respectively. Also, resource-scarce northern African countries, such as Morocco and 
Tunisia are more active in manufacturing FDI than any other tropical SSA country. In short, 
although not captured through the regression, geographic distance from the equator may function 
as direct determinant for FDI into manufacturing on the African continent. 
 
Second, for FDI into non-SSA countries the distance to the equator does not matter, since other 
developing  countries  have  managed  to  overcome  the  geographic  constraint  by  adequate 
infrastructure  and  good  health  care  that  promoted  manufacturing  and  market-seeking  FDI. DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    26 
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However, also there geographic tendencies of FDI location can be observed within the countries, 
due  to  the  historical  roots  of  coastal  urbanization  and  settlement  caused  by  colonialist 
transoceanic trade and exploration of natural resources in developing countries of today. 
 
Responsible for Africa´s division into separate states were the former colonial powers that drew 
African borders arbitrary at the Berlin conference in 1884, deciding on African countries’ land 
area  (geography)  today:  an  example  of  how  history  modified  geography  and  subsequently 
economics. Larger SSA countries by virtue of their magnitude will have a greater likelihood to 
have resource-wealth contained within its borders if the land area is larger. For that reason the 
modest correlation of SSA countries´ land area and resource-based FDI is traceable. 
 
4.3  The Resource Trap and FDI 
 
The term “resource curse” or “paradox of plenty” describes the failure of resource-endowed 
countries to benefit from its natural wealth. Paradoxically, natural resources might become more 
an  economic  curse  than  an  economic  blessing,  since  many  resource-rich  countries  are  more 
miserable in terms of political conflict and economic setback than other resource-poor countries 
(Auty, 1993).  
 
The “resource curse” is a complex phenomenon for which three processes come into play. The 
first is currency appreciation due to resource revenues and its negative effect on competitive 
industries in the country, called “Dutch Disease”. The second is the fluctuation (boom and bust 
cycle) in commodity prices, having an unreliable effect on revenue inflows. The third is the 
effect on political and institutional conditions which impact is far greater than for the previous 
two economic processes (Humphreys et al., 2007). It is the third factor that determines FDI 
effectively to non-SSA but less to SSA countries, revealed in the previous regression results 
(Table  4,  Column  4).  According  to  Karl  (1997),  the  fate  of  petro-states  needs  to  be 
acknowledged in the circumstance in which economies shape institutions and in turn are shaped 
by them.  
 
However, it´s not compelling that many resource-rich SSA countries are poor precisely because 
they have abundant natural resources and consequently suffer under the “resource curse”. There 
are other countries like natural abundant Botswana that have grown rapidly over the past 50 
years. Without doubt, natural-endowed countries are more vulnerable than other non-endowed 
developing  countries.  However,  natural  abundance  becomes  a  curse  through  the  channel  of 
fundamental institutional and political economy factors that lead to worse economic outcomes 
(Acemoglu, 2008). Hence, the disappointing outcomes of oil-exporting states cannot be fully 
understood detached from their institutional development. Consequently, this chapter seeks to 
explain  the  effect  of  FDI  into  resource-rich  SSA  and  non-SSA  countries  and  its  effects  on 
institutional, conflict and present and future FDI development. 
 
Its complex to say whether FDI has the potential to influence institutions since theoretically the 
causal direction is regarded to go the other way – a superior rule of law attracts FDI. However, 
the causal arrow between economic development and institutional change runs in both directions. 
Therefore, this permits to reverse the causal direction and check upon a feedback mechanism of 
FDI/GDP  inflows  on  the  rule  of  law  for  non-SSA  and  SSA  countries.  For  this  purpose  the 
interaction term SSA*FDI/GDP was constructed to estimate whether SSA countries that received 
FDI also have improved their rule of law as a consequence. Have investors given the rule of law DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    27 
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as  much  importance  in  SSA  as  in  other  developing  countries  and  what  has  been  the  net 
institutional effect of FDI to SSA and non-SSA countries? 
 
A simultaneity problem may arise; in the case of at least one of the explanatory variables is 
determined (endogenous) jointly with the dependent variable. The dependent variable (rule of 
law) would be endogenous as it is correlated with the error term. However, the inclusion of 
explanatory variables in the regression model in Table 5, such as oil and mineral exporter status 
were statistically insignificant in the combined regression of in Column 4, Table 4 which solves 
for  the  simultaneity  problem.  Hence  the  error  term  does  not  correlate  with  the  dependent 
variable, not picking up an unobserved simultaneity bias.  
 
Result 4 identified that the rule of law promotes FDI/GDP to non-SSA but has no significant 
impact  on  FDI/GDP  to  SSA  countries.  In  this  sub-section,  I  am  interested  in  the  feedback 
mechanism of FDI/GDP onto developing countries´ confidence of agents into the rules of society 
and conflict occurrence. The results have been drawn from the robust Panel data of the same 
sample  as  applied  before,  where  this  time  the  dependent  variable  is  the  “rule  of  law”  and 
“absence of conflict”. I favour the robust panel regression of the 3 sub-periods between 1997 and 
2006 in column 1 and 2, given that the panel data set explores the cross-sectional and time series 
dimension, increasing the number of observations. 
 
The  Hausman  test  statistic  is  5.17.  So  with  an  α  of  0.05  I  would  reject  the  H0  hypothesis. 
Formally, the 5 percent critical value (with 2 degrees of freedom) is 5.99 which is higher than the 
Hausman statistic of 5.17. Therefore, I reject the H1 of a fixed effects model and accept the H0 
hypothesis, which indicates that a random effects model is most appropriate, capturing the binary 
variables in my sample as before. 
 
Table 5: Random Effects Model Estimation: Resource Curse and FDI 
 
(1) (2)



























(Robust p-values in parentheses) 
* Significance at the 0.10 level. 
** Significance at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significance at the 0.01 level. 
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(viii) Result 8 
FDI induces institutional change (rule of law) in non-SSA countries. However, FDI flows into 
SSA left institutions unchanged and fueled (financed) slightly violent conflicts and civil unrest. 
Oil-seeking  FDI  in  developing  countries  (SSA  and  non-SSA)  is  not  selective  in  terms  of 
institutions. 
 
This highlights the fact that FDI into SSA has not been directed to economic sectors in which the 
rule of law and absence of conflict is important, and therefore FDI did not induce growth and 
neither  institutional  change  in  SSA.  FDI  flows  into  SSA  improved  the  rule  of  law  only 
marginally  by  0.005  for  which  the  sum  of  the  estimates  of  FDI  to  SSA  and  non-SSA  was 
calculated, as shown in Table 5, Column 1. However, FDI into non-SSA promoted the rule of 
law, which was ten times higher (0.049) than for SSA. Through which channels did FDI induce 
institutional improvements in non-SSA? 
 
FDI  to  non-SSA  specialized  in  manufacturing  goods  triggered  sustained  economic  growth 
through  the  division  of  labour,  which  indirectly  induced  additional  fundamental  institutional 
change. Economic growth reduced unemployment and social and economic inequality in many 
non-SSA  countries,  while  enriching  and  strengthening  the  working  middle  class,  as  well  as 
commercial interest groups. Consequently, economic and political interest groups outside the 
government circle became sufficiently powerful to place limits and reforms on the state power. 
Additional  political  reforms  and  institutions  to  protect  property  rights  spurred  further  FDI 
inflows to non-SSA regions, such as East and South-East Asia. This institutional development 
induced by growth is in line with the experience of countries in early modern Europe (1500-
1850)  with  easy  access  to  the  Atlantic  and  non-absolutist  initial  institutions.  According  to 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) in non-absolutist countries, such as England and the Dutch Republic, 
Atlantic trade provided substantial profits and political power for commercial interests outside 
the  royal  circle.  Hence,  in  the  early  21
st  century  this  growth  mechanism  of  stimulating 
institutional change has led to similar effects in terms of FDI, economic historically somewhat 
analogous to Atlantic trade, back in times. 
 
Oil-seeking FDI does not distribute resource-revenues to the broad middle-class but contrary 
enriches corrupt  government officials and therefore prevent institutional enhancement by the 
explained  process,  above.  Furthermore,  investors  do  not  give  much  importance  to  the 
institutional framework because their investment is resource-seeking, especially in SSA. The rule 
of law in oil-exporting SSA countries is more than twice as low as for non-SSA oil-exporting 
countries, when summing the two coefficients to get the total effect for SSA oil-exporters in 
Table  5,  Column  1.  Hence,  oil-seeking  FDI  is  not  selective  in  terms  of  institutions.  The 
prerequisite for the rule of law becomes relatively less important since the utility of natural 
commodities for multinationals is higher than the hazard of low institutional quality and violent 
conflict. Additionally, SSA oil is state-owned; consequently foreign firms in these countries will 
deal directly with the local government that will treat multinationals well since they themselves 
rely on the associated rewards of the companies, export revenues, exploration technology and 
know-how. 
 
In sum, investors have advocated more importance to the rule of law in non-SSA countries than 
in SSA simply due to the different type of FDI, given that on average non-SSA countries have 
more stable institutions and fewer violent conflicts (check Table 3). Hence, foreign businesses in 
capital-intensive  manufacturing  in  non-SSA  face  a  lesser  risk  of  expropriation  and  policy 
reversal than in SSA. In addition, non-SSA countries have on average higher per capita income 
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tremendous consequences especially for petro-states. Their  exclusive wealth means that they 
differ  structurally  and  strategically  from  non-natural  resource  endowed  developing  countries 
(mostly non-SSA) that are intensive in manufacturing and agricultural exports. Capital-intensive, 
large-scale and technological complex industrial production and associated FDI is common in 
non-resource-endowed  developing  countries,  mostly  non-SSA.  The  statistically  insignificant 
effect of mineral-exporters relative to petro-exporters may be explained by the fact that mining 
states are economically dependent on a single resource, while oil-exporters comparatively face 
an even greater acuteness (dilemma) of their dependence characterized by vulnerable export-
earnings (windfall rents) which affects the  growth rate, inflation and investment rates (Karl, 
1997).  
 
The relevance of “resource-rich poverty” for developing countries cannot be overstated, since 29 
percent of the African population lives in countries in which resource-wealth is a major income-
source (Collier, 2008), therefore let’s focus on oil-exporting SSA and non-SSA countries. Being 
an oil-exporting non-SSA country has a negative impact on its institutional measure. For SSA 
this  effect  is  even  more  negative,  formulating  the  natural  resource  abundance  trap.  Natural 
resource  dependency  is  likely  to  induce  autocracy  and  dictatorship,  rent-seeking  behaviour, 
indirect  finance  of  conflicts,  the  “Dutch  Disease”  exchange  rate  dilemma,  exposure  of  the 
national economy to external shocks and endless resource-seeking FDI. This assortment is highly 
detrimental  for  economic  development  and  good  policies,  while  condemning  non-resource-
seeking FDI. 
 
FDI flows into SSA did not induce peace but fueled (financed) to some extent violent conflicts. 
FDI  into  the  Sudan  represents  a  fitting  example of  the  negative  effect  FDI  flows  can  have, 
regarding  conflict  occurrence,  as  shown  in Table  5,  Column  2.  For  SSA  countries,  conflict 
occurrence increased slightly to -0.008, when summing the SSA and non-SSA coefficients of 
absence of conflict. Despite strong FDI and commercial ties between China and the oil-exporter 
Sudan, the Chinese have not pressured the Sudanese regime to withdraw from war in Darfur but 
rather added “fuel” via oil-revenues and military arms imports in a cynical attempt to secure oil-
resources. In turn, these revenues have been spent on arms, indirectly financing the conflict – oil 
for military arms. Chinese FDI into Africa does not pay attention to the rule of law and conflict 
occurrence but is mainly resource-seeking, while improving infrastructure development in SSA 
for the purpose of resource-transportation and trade. Memories come to mind of colonial powers 
formerly supplying African rulers with military equipment to establish control of the natural 
resources. Overall, it reflects the intensity of China´s quest for energy security and compliance to 
do business with the most devastated and dangerous countries in the world, while doing harm to 
economic development prospects in these countries. 
 
According to Collier and Hoeffler (1998), dependence on natural resources increases the risk of 
civil war considerably. They compared countries with 10 percent and 25 percent of their GDP 
coming from natural resources the risk of a civil war in the following 5 years increases from 11 
percent to 29 percent. Furthermore oil is distinctive, since it is more likely to be related to civil 
unrest than any other natural export-commodity, justifying the statistically insignificant mineral-
exporter  variable  relative  to  oil-exporters  for  both  the  rule  of  law  and  conflict  dependent 
variables.  
 
However,  it’s  not  only  primary  commodity  dependence  but  also  per  capita  income  that 
influences  the  likelihood  of  civil  war  occurrence.  Resources  trigger  sustained  economic 
prosperity in countries of high levels of per capita income (for example Norway and Australia), 
whereas  in  poor  developing  countries  it  becomes  a  trigger  for  civil  unrest.  Subsequently, DT cooperación y desarrollo 2009/06    30 
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developing countries that find themselves under a particular income threshold are particularly 
vulnerable  to  primary  commodity  dependency  -  SSA  societies  are  a  long  way  below  this 
threshold.  It  is  self-explaining  why  civil  violence  does  not  act  as  a  magnet  for  business 
investments  -  apart  from  resource-seeking  FDI.  The  negative  investment  effect  comes  from 
within and outside. If local businesses in SSA are aware that they are located in a country at risk 
of violent conflict, they anticipate by being less likely to invest (Collier, 2009). The same holds 
for FDI when civil conflict is present. FDI will be absent in manufacturing but still be directed to 
natural resources. 
 
There are little examples of countries that have prospered sustainably of an oil-driven economy, 
but contrary, states have failed to harness resource wealth for sustained growth. In particular in 
SSA-oil exporter countries FDI in manufacturing remains an illusion. The danger may occur, if a 
country has enough natural resources it may forget about other economic activity – because it 
can  afford  it  as  the  Persian  Gulf  states:  Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait.  However,  particularly  in 
resource-rich countries investment is evidently important since this is how the resource-wealth is 
able to undergo the transformation of a sustainable income. Therefore, the diversification of FDI 
into other industrial sectors is imperative for sustained growth, which may only occur by major 
enhancement of institutional quality. Madagascar reveals to be a good example of demonstrating 
the  importance  of  institutional  quality.  Madagascar  attracted  through  good  policies 
manufacturing FDI in the textile sector. After a coup d’état vertical FDI re-emigrated drastically. 
The well-known success-story of diamond-endowed Botswana is an example of how important a 
good institutional framework can be for sustained economic growth and peace. Botswana was 
able  to  prevent  the  “resource-curse”  through  the  implementation  of  sound  government 
management in the mining sectors (diamonds, gold and copper), while good governance, low 
corruption levels and political stability spurred economic growth and FDI. 
 
The  consequence  of  the  “resource  curse”  is  two-folded  for  FDI.  First,  resource-dependent 
developing  countries  have  on  average  poorer  institutions  and  a  higher  probability  of  civil 
conflict,  which  attracts  solely  resource-seeking  FDI,  but  crowds  out  manufacturing  FDI  and 
decreases the prospects for a flexible and appropriate modification to an oil-led development 
path. As a result of institutional decay, future FDI into the manufacturing sectors becomes an 
illusion,  while  the  profound  dependency  on  natural  resources  in  turn  reduces  future  growth 
(Sachs and Warner, 2001). 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this additional estimation is that FDI to non-SSA induces 
growth,  institutional  change  and  reduces  conflict  occurrence.  However,  FDI  into  SSA  is 
resource-seeking and non-growth inducing, consequently leaving institutions unchanged. SSA´s 
resource wealth attracts major FDI inflows but crowds out FDI into manufacturing, essential for 
sustained  economic  growth.  This  “resource-seeking  FDI  trap”  eventually  impedes  sustained 
economic growth and may condemn a country in the long-run to the “slow lane” of resource-
dependency. The relevant policy implication for resource-endowed developing countries is to 
diversify into manufacturing industries with the support of international FDI and simultaneous 
institutional enhancement. 
 
The  following  policy  implications  in  section  5  are  directed  to  tackle  the  dilemma  of  the 
“resource-seeking FDI trap” and exploit the resource wealth in a more fruitful, sustainable and 
economic viable approach. 
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5.  Conclusion and Policy Implication 
 
So that oil does not become "the excrement of the devil" as Perez Alfonzo, Venezuelan oil- 
minister labeled it in the 1960s, but an opportunity for diversified future FDI inflows, a couple of 
measures need to be taken. My policy implications will not focus on direct remedies to the 
“resource  curse”.  However,  I  will  address  exit  strategies  for  resource-endowed  developing 
countries that suffer from the maladies of the paradox of plenty through the power of FDI. In 
particular, SSA must inhibit long-run growth-focused structural changes to attract diversified 
FDI that inevitably may lead to a break-down of the negative effects of the “resource curse”. The 
promotion of good governance and the reduction of corruption is a precedent condition for future 
sustained growth via industry diversification. Oil revenues need not to be a curse. 
 
It´s an important policy implication that institutional improvement in natural resource abundant 
developing countries has the potential to bring about a second FDI-wave, in diversified resource-
related industries and manufacturing that theoretically and historically led to sustained economic 
growth. Hence, for FDI into oil-related industries a safer institutional environment with less 
corruption (more transparency) is vital and can become a potential escape from the “resource 
curse”, if being accompanied by non-resource based fiscal policies, education and a diversified 
non-resource industry in competitive sectors, as for instance, tourism. Reinvested oil earnings 
into  resource-related  industries  and  manufacturing  industries  will  enhance  productivity  and 
minimize the risk of “Dutch Disease”. Hence, FDI can play an active development role and has 
the  potential  to  run  complementary  to  aid,  which  has  been  highly  misdirected  in  these 
environments in the past.  
 
Historically, multinational oil and mining firms benefited from asymmetric bargaining power, 
capturing natural resources in the less developed world (Humphreys at al., 2007). However, oil 
and minerals are highly demanded scarce commodities. On the other hand, natural resource´s 
bargaining power has fallen short of potential and is undermined by rent-seeking and corrupt 
government  officials  of  resource-cursed  countries,  unable  to  implement  sustainable  growth 
promoting measures. The potential “muscle-power” of resource-endowed countries needs to be 
harnessed to force investment from abroad into diversified oil- and non-oil-related industries, 
setting  up  the  institutional  framework  and  fiscal  policies  to  finally  lift  the  “resource  curse”, 
which detains FDI into these specific branches.  
 
Responses are therefore required not only from host countries but also at the international level 
of FDI, since reforms that bring an end to the “resource curse” are in the interest of both SSA 
countries and consumer states’ multinational firms. Hence, the international soaring demand for 
SSA´s natural commodities can in turn be made use of by being made conditional to diversified 
FDI,  additional  to  the  largely  resource-seeking  investments.  A  contract  with  a  compulsory 
development appointment clause would bind resource-seeking FDI to additional investments into 
mining-  and  petroleum-related  process  industries,  as  well  as  non-resource  export  sectors  of 
manufacturing  plants.  Development  and  resource-seeking  FDI  in  SSA  must  not  be  a 
contradiction but need to be understood by multinationals to go hand in hand. Only then, FDI 
can  play  a  prominent  role  in  the  design  of  economic  development  strategies  for  poverty 
alleviation. 
 
A serious concern to this policy strategy is that foreign oil and mining firms need to obtain a 
concession to exploit natural resources of the rulers of the countries. Here, SSA faces a serious 
agent-principal dilemma. Because the rulers of resource-rich SSA countries are often rewarded 
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incentive to produce public goods (Humphreys et al., 2007; Olson, 2000). This creates incentives 
for personal gain and explains why rulers remain in power longer in resource-rich countries as 
rulers in resource-scarce countries which ultimately increase the proneness to political turmoil 
and  civil  strife  within  such  countries.  In  turn,  adverse  international  attention  from  the  non-
resource-seeking FDI community is the consequence. Subsequently, who should enforce these 
conditional clauses regarding FDI diversification in such prohibitive environments? 
 
In  this  respect,  the  government’s  ministries  of  economic  development  and  international 
cooperation in the FDI home-countries need to understand to make this policy implication part of 
their general development strategy, to ensure that FDI outflows are directed to diversified non-
resource  sectors.  This  may  go  quite  contrary  to  multinational´s  interest,  therefore  the 
governments of resource-seeking FDI origin is required to set incentives. Concretely, original aid 
payments  made  directly  to  governments  (bilateral  aid)  should  be  selectively  transferred  to 
businesses that commit themselves to this development policy and invest into Africa´s resource-
related industries rather than transporting it back home for processing. Additionally, investments 
into manufacturing segments require incentives via subsidies, too. This would propound quite a 
revolution in the aid appointments of which Dambisa Moyo (2008) indubitably would be in 
favour of. 
 
The role of Africa´s largest foreign investor China is ambivalent, since it provides substantial 
infrastructure development and employment for SSA, while simultaneously not allocating its 
FDI  towards  diversified  and  natural  resource  wealth  related  industries,  that  in  turn  would 
promote productivity and long-term growth. This must be the next strategy. However, Chinese 
imports outcompete and underbid local SSA firms and are not hiring enough local labour, while 
the pure interest in resources and land dominates. The recent acquisitions of Chinese companies 
of foreign SSA land for grain production, not only demonstrates a recent distrust in market-
values but exemplifies the trend that Chinese people work in SSA to send the grain home for 
later biofuel fabrication and food-processing (The Economist, 2009). 
 
Chinese investment into transport, telecommunication and power infrastructure needs to serve as 
a  base  for  the  second  FDI-wave,  while  good  governance  will  encourage  this  wave.  Foreign 
Chinese, Indian, Russian, Japanese and other investor’s capital into SSA´s natural resources has 
the potential to become a serious development tool when a marriage between primary resource 
business interest and development gets a chance of implementation. More than ever the natural 
commodities,  like  crude  oil  must  stay  temporarily  in  the  country  for  linkage  to  oil-related 
industries and manufacturing FDI, which in turn will employ and train local labour and generate 
technology  and  future  FDI  spillovers.  In  short,  the  globalization  of  profit-opportunities  for 
multinational firms via FDI needs to be understood and cannot forego without the globalization 
of social responsibility (Domínguez Martín, 2008). 
 
Liberal trade policies had a positive effect on FDI inflows (Table 4), hence interregional SSA 
trade blocs should intensify their efforts to pursue potential FDI inflows and economic growth 
benefits  from  trade  liberalization.  However,  this  positive  trade-effect  may  actually  hide  and 
indicate part of the problem of “resource flight” rather than resources staying in the country 
awaiting the second FDI wave. On the other hand, its complex to isolate this effect, therefore in 
general, liberal trade policies induce FDI growth in SSA, which needs to be maintained and 
further stimulated. The break-down of trade barriers stimulates an investor friendly environment 
since inter-SSA trade has the potential to encourage infrastructure coordination, increase market 
and supplier access, while cutting transport costs due to lower tariffs and improved transport 
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the landlocked hinterland. Their geographical distance constraint for international trade may be 
reduced and neighbourhood-growth-spillovers launched to lessen geographic inequality.  
 
This  work  examined  the  determinants  of  FDI  to  developing  countries,  while  giving  special 
attention to the unsuccessful FDI-history for SSA, which by and large, has been confirmed. At 
the same time the regression results report a dramatic increase in FDI/GDP into SSA relative to 
Asiedu´s (2002) period of time of 1988-1997 and this work´s modern timeframe 1997-2006. 
Furthermore, increased FDI inflows from Asian developing countries into SSA are expected to 
increase in the future. The dilemma appears, when defining the type of FDI to SSA, it’s mainly 
resource-seeking rather than directed to manufacturing- or even market-seeking FDI segments as 
it’s the case in non-SSA countries, in particular for South-East Asia. The recent intensity of FDI 
into  corrupt  and  conflict-driven  resource-rich  SSA  reflects  the  global  “scramble”  for  energy 
security and profits in the early 21
st century, for which Chinese FDI stands out and marks a 
unique case study. 
 
Almost all fundamental determinants of FDI were found to be relative superior for non-SSA 
relative to SSA countries. This all is strong evidence that specifically, infrastructure development 
and superior institutional quality captured by the rule of law variable promote FDI to non-SSA 
countries. Despite absolute progress in FDI for SSA, a relative decline regarding infrastructure 
and institutions remains, which in the framework of a global integrated competing economy 
won’t  be  enough  to  promote  non-resource  FDI.  For  SSA  openness  to  trade  was  the  only 
significant determinant, which by itself is a positive sign, capturing for the first time the positive 
FDI  effects  of  the  SSA  concert  effort  of  economic  integration  and  trade  liberalisation. 
Regrettably,  the  interpretation  is  more  complex,  since  the  higher  is  the  openness  to  trade 
coefficient for SSA, it may capture the increased resource-seeking FDI effect by increased trade-
flows for SSA. In a “neo-colonialist fashion” natural resources are explored by foreign firms but 
not processed locally by SSA labour but transported back to the home-country for subsequent 
value-added treatment. 
 
A second conclusion is that the quality of institutions is a reliable and equitable driver of rapid 
economic  development  and  FDI  in  non-SSA  countries.  FDI  into  SSA  is  based  in  primary 
agriculture and natural resources (oil and mining), which in combination with low institutional 
settings have not attracted, but scared off related processing industries of local resource wealth 
and manufacturing businesses. It´s institutions, which allow foreign investors to reduce their 
aversion  and  risk  perception  of  the  African  continent  via  dependable  property  rights, 
management of conflict and law and order to create investment opportunities. In recent history 
many non-SSA and a handful SSA countries with past institutional change were in turn rewarded 
by a sustainable wave of FDI for economic growth. Interestingly, these policy implications for 
African  countries  have  not  been  identified  to  be  different  from  those  small  resource-scarce 
countries, such as Ireland and Singapore almost 30 years ago. 
 
A third finding is that geography does not influence directly FDI flows to SSA and non-SSA 
countries, because none of the geographic variables were significant, except land area in SSA. 
However, geography might have an indirect impact on FDI via infrastructure, transport costs and 
GDP per capita growth, in particular in tropical adverse geographic SSA. When checking on the 
African map, manufacturing FDI is clustered further away from the equator in Africa, in both the 
north and south of the natural resource-blessed continent, suggesting a geographical relationship 
of FDI, directed to non-resource segments, such as manufacturing.  
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Fourth  and  final,  I  conclude  that  understanding  the  SSA  FDI  tragedy  requires  not  only  a 
description of the unfavourable country characteristics, but also an understanding of why these 
characteristics were so unfavourable for FDI. The formulation of the “resource curse” has its 
influence via FDI for economic growth in natural resource rich countries, concerning strongly 
the oil sector. Resource-seeking FDI therefore does not induce sustained growth and institutional 
change. The consequence of the “resource curse” is two-fold for FDI. First, resource-dependent 
developing  countries  have  on  average  poorer  institutions  and  a  higher  probability  of  civil 
conflict. Second, this attracts solely resource-seeking FDI, but crowds out the second FDI wave 
into manufacturing and resource-related industries. This restrains future sustained growth and 
traps these countries even more profoundly, by making them more dependent on volatile natural 
resource rents in the long-run. The acknowledgement of the “resource curse” in relation with 
FDI is absolutely crucial for future policy implications. 
 
In a closing appeal I would like to address that foreign investors should not re-invent African 
colonial history in a capitalistic business manner that once contributed to the bleak reality of 
Africa  today.  The  extraction  and  depletion  of  African  treasures  must  serve  both  capitalist 
consumer states and African growth and welfare sustainably. To ensure this on the international 
level governments are required to live up to their historical and social responsibility. The time is 
ripe  for  multinationals  to  rethink  SSA  opportunities  and  simultaneously  to  help  the  region 
achieve its promise by contributing much-needed capital, business skills and global connections 
(Collier and Warnholz, 2009). Until then, according to the former UN-secretary-general Kofi 
Annan (United Nations, 1999), “Africa's profitability will remain one of the best kept secrets in 
today's world economy”. 
 
Future research may study the effect of changes in wages, monetary and exchange rate policies, 
taxation and other variables that may determine FDI flows for developing countries. Moreover, 
the development of institutions and resource-seeking FDI yields potential and therefore deserves 
additional future research. An accurate splitting (if available) of the types of FDI (resource-
seeking or manufacturing-seeking) may give more accurate and straightforward results at the 
regression stage. The direction of China´s future FDI and trade will be serving as a historical 
study to see the demographical and economic growth of China versus its scarce arable land area 
and energy sources which outcome will change economic history in the medium and long-term, 
in particular in resource-rich African countries. 
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7.  Appendix 
 
Table A1. Countries grouped by region 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America & 
Caribbean
Asia Other
Angola Argentina Bangladesh Algeria
Benin Bolivia China Egypt
Botswana Brazil India Morocco
Burkina Faso Chile Indonesia Papua New Guinea
Cameroon Colombia Malaysia Tunisia
Cape Verde Costa Rica Nepal
Central Africa Ecuador Pakistan
Congo Republic El Salvador Philippines
Cote d´Ivoire Grenada Singapore
Equatorial Guinea Guatemala South Korea
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Table A2. Summary statistics for the full sample (72 countries) 
 
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
100 * (FDI/GDP) 3.562 3.825 -1.977 23.025
100 * (Imports + Exports)/GDP 79.06 53.51 17.313 433.421
Ln(phones per 100 population) 3.439 1.538 0.541 6.301
Ln(1/GDP per capita) -6.969 1.182 -10.203 -4.98
  ln of GDP per capita * 100 1.056 6.655 -17.52 18.428
Inflation rate 10.166 36.141 -0.207 528.219
100 * M2/GDP 39.916 27.781 7.977 144.084
Rule of Law -0.446 0.673 -1.783 1.767
Conflict -0.443 0.805 -2.384 1.262
Bureaucracy (days) 56.486 41.645 7 233
Distance from the equator 0.050 0.197 -0.407 0.417
Land area (km




Table A3. Variables and data sources 
 
Variables Source of data
Institutional variables
Rule of Law Kaufmann et al. (2008)
Absence of violence and political  Kaufmann et al. (2008)
Time required to start a business World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
Policy variables
Openness, trade (% GDP) World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
Infrastructure proxy (phone lines
per 100 population)
World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
Growth in GDP per capita World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
Inflation, consumer prices (annual  World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank
Geography variables
Land area (km) Gallup et al. (1999) data set (obtainable from
www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata)
Distance from equator Hall and Jones (1997) data set (obtainable from http:// 
elsa.berkeley.edu/~chad/HallJones400.asc)
Landlocked Gallup et al. (1999) data set (obtainable from
www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata)
Oil-exporter status (more than
33% of total exports)
Miguel et al. (2004) data set
Mineral-exporter status (more than
33% of total exports)
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 2006 Minerals
Yearbook, (obtainable from
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/africa.html)
HIPC status (until 2007) International Monetary Fund (2007), Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) 
 